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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS EXPANDS PROTECTED CLASS UNDER SECTION ONE OF 
THE FAA TO INCLUDE WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS: A COMMENT ON SINGH V. 




I. Introduction  
 Section two of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “is a congressional declaration 
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”1 Section two has been the 
lens through which arbitration agreements have been viewed since Justice Brennan wrote 
it in 1983 in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.2 
Consistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration, courts seldom invalidate arbitral 
agreements negotiated and agreed upon between two consenting parties. However, 
section one of the FAA includes an exemption.3 The exemption states that the FAA does 
not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."4  
 The Supreme Court has generally tried limiting the scope of the exemption in an 
attempt to limit forum shopping from opportunistic counsel.5 However, the Court has 
ruled consistently that the employment contracts of railroad employees and seamen are 
exempt from the FAA.6 It is the part of the clause concerning “workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce” that has required the most clarification from courts.7 In 
the case that will be discussed in this comment, a driver for the ridesharing company 
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber) has asked the Third Circuit to find that he is an employee 
that is engaged in interstate commerce, and thus his dispute should be exempt from 
arbitration under section one of the FAA.8 The Third Circuit reversed a decision by a 
 
* The author is an Associate Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2021 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Law School. 
 
1 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 
2 Id. at 24. 
 




5 Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit 
Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA.L.REV. 91, 92 (1998). 
 
6 Chandris v. Latis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (holding that seaman of all sorts are exempt from the FAA 
under section one). 
 
7 9 U.S.C. §1 (1925). 
 
8 Singh v. Uber Tech. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2019) 
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lower court that compelled arbitration, and remanded for a new trial consistent with an 
interpretation granting an exemption for employees who transport passengers.9  
 
II. Case Background  
 Jaswinder Singh (Singh) was a driver for Uber.10 He brought a putative class 
action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on behalf of himself and all those similarly 
situated Uber drivers in New Jersey.11 Singh claims that Uber “misclassified” the drivers 
as independent contractors instead of employees.12 As a result of the misclassification, 
the drivers were deprived of overtime compensation and were forced to incur business 
expenses for the benefit of Uber.13 
 Uber removed the case to the federal district court in New Jersey, and then filed a 
motion to dismiss and sought to compel Singh to arbitrate based on the arbitration 
agreement Singh had signed when he began working for Uber.14 Singh opposed the 
motion to compel arbitration on multiple grounds.15 Singh first argued that no valid 
agreement existed between him and Uber at the time that Singh began his employment 
with Uber.16 Singh further contended that, even if a valid agreement did exist, Singh 
would not be bound to the arbitration provision of the contract because Uber failed to 
meet its burden to show that the provision was a constitutional waiver of the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial, the provision is excluded under the residual clause of 
section one of the FAA, the provision violated multiple state and federal laws, and the 
provision was unconscionable.17 Singh additionally claimed that the agreement with Uber 
is within the residual clause of section one of the FAA.18 With respect to Singh’s second 
contention regarding the residual clause and why he should not be bound by the 
arbitration provision, Singh stated the necessity for discovery on the essential section one 
 
9 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215. 
 
10 Id. at 210, 214. 
 
11 Id. at 214. 
 
12 Id. at 215-16. 
 
13 Id. at 215-16. 
 






17 Id. at 216. See  29 U.S.C.S §151 (1947); 29 U.S.C.S §101 (1932); N.J. Stat. §34:11-56a. (1966) 
 
18 Singh, 939 F.3d at 216. 
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residual clause inquiry, as discovery would allow Singh to prove he was engaged in 
interstate commerce.19  
 Uber asked the district court to reject Singh’s claim on the grounds that the 
residual clause only applies to workers who transport goods, not passengers.20 The 
district court granted Uber’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.21 However, the 
district court did not reach the “engaged-in-interstate commerce” inquiry.22 The district 
court ruled that Singh did not fall within the ambit of the residual clause of section one, 
holding that the clause only extends to “transportation workers who transport goods, not 
those who transport passengers.”23 Therefore, the district court ruled that the arbitrator 
would decide the remaining questions not answered during the district court’s original 
ruling.24 
 
III. Third Circuit’s Analysis 
 The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court and relied on precedent, which 
stated that section one of the FAA may extend to classes of transportation workers who 
transport passengers, so long as they are engaged in, or work closely related to, interstate 
commerce. 25 The Third Circuit remanded the decision back to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with the Third Circuit’s interpretation.26  
 Before any case involving arbitration can move forward, the court must decide the 
threshold issue of if the arbitrator has the power to decide to hear the claim.27 Arbitration 
agreements are equal with all other contracts, and should be enforced according to their 
terms agreed on by the parties.28 When the FAA is controlling in arbitration disputes, 
parties are free to include a delegation clause to the contract that allows the arbitrator to 
 




21 Id. at 216. 
 
22 Id. at 216-17. 
 




25 Id. at 214. 
 
26 Id. at 228. 
 
27 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (discussing the 
court’s ability to decide the “gateway question of arbitrability”). 
 
28 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215; MacDonald v. Cashcall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 226 (3rd Cir. 2018) (explaining the 
FAA’s effect on arbitration agreements is to make arbitration agreements as valid as all other agreements). 
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decide arbitrability.29 However, since Singh contended that the FAA is not controlling 
based on section one of the FAA, the Third Circuit relied on New Prime, Inc. v. Olivera, 
which was decided by the Supreme Court during the pendency of this appeal.30 New 
Prime stated that courts should be the ones to determine whether an agreement is 
excluded from FAA coverage, even where the parties have agreed to a delegation clause, 
like Singh and Uber have in this case.31 The Third Circuit decided that the district court 
should properly determine whether the arbitration agreement is valid.32 
 With the court using the precedent in New Prime to rule that the Third Circuit is 
responsible for deciding if the arbitration agreement is exempt under section one of the 
FAA, the Third Circuit next decided if Singh had put forth enough evidence to warrant 
discovery on Singh’s contention that the provision was excluded under the residual clause 
of section one of the FAA.33 The Third Circuit laid out the applicable standard of review 
under which motions to compel arbitration could be decided.34 As described in Guidotti 
v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC., the two possible standards are the motion to 
dismiss standard, or the summary judgment standard.35 The motion to dismiss standard 
applies when a party’s claims are “subject to an enforceable arbitration clause,” meaning 
the complaint and incorporated documents support a valid agreement to arbitrate on their 
face.36 The summary judgment standard, however, is used when “the complaint and its 
supporting documents are unclear” as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, or the 
plaintiff has responded with “additional facts sufficient to place the agreement in 
dispute,” requiring a “restricted inquiry” into the additional facts.37 The Third Circuit 
articulated a balancing test, juxtaposing the efficiency and speed fostered by the FAA, 
 
29 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70-72 (2010) (discussing 
parties’ ability to include delegation clause that gives an arbitrator the ability to decide the threshold issue 
of arbitrability). 
 
30 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215; New Prime Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 532, 538 (granting an exemption to independent 
contractors under section one of the FAA). 
 
31 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215; New Prime Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 532, 538. 
 
32 Singh, 939 F.3d at 215. 
 
33 Singh, 939 F.3d at 216. 
 
34 Id.  
 
35 Singh, 939 F.3d at 216; Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 771-772 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (describing the two standards of review for motion to compel arbitration: the motion to dismiss 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)). 
 
36 Singh, 939 F.3d at 216. 
 
37 Id.  
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with the need for clarity of an ambiguous argument.38 Since the Third Circuit determined 
this to be an agreement that needed clarity, the court used the summary judgment 
standard and allowed for a “restricted inquiry” in an attempt to clarify whether the FAA 
controlled.39 
 Substantively, the court decided the question of whether the section one residual 
clause applies, and the FAA is not controlling, could be determined by answering two 
questions: first, whether section one applies to transportation workers who transport 
passengers; and, second, whether Singh belongs to a class of workers that are engaged in 
interstate commerce.40 The Third Circuit had previously ruled that the residual clause 
only includes those other classes of workers "who are actually engaged in the movement 
of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in 
practical effect part of it."41 The court also relied on precedent from a pair of cases 
involving the Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, a bus company where the employees 
transported passengers.42 In both cases, the Third Circuit ruled that the workers of the bus 
line employees qualified as employment of a class of workers engaged in interstate 
commerce.43 The court saw these decisions confirmed in later Supreme Court decisions.44 
Consequently, the court denied Uber’s assertions that section one of the FAA refers only 
to workers who transport goods, not to workers who transport people.45 The court ruled 
that section one applied to transportation workers who transport passengers.46 
 Next, the court decided whether Singh belonged to a class of workers that are 
engaged in interstate commerce.47 This was a matter of first impression in the Third 
 
38 Id. at 218. 
 
39 Id. at 216. 
 
40 Id. at 219. 
 
41 Singh, 939 F.3d at 220; Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of 
America, (U.E.) Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).  
 
42 Singh, 939 F.3d at 220; Amalgamated Association Street Electric Railway of Motor Coach Employees of 
America, Local Div. 1210 v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951); 
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Association Street Electric Railway of Motor Coach 
Employees of America, Local Div. 1063, 193 F.2d 327, 328 (3d Cir. 1952). 
 
43 Singh, 939 F.3d at 220; Amalgamated Association Street Electric Railway of Motor Coach Employees of 
America, Local Div. 1210, 192 F.2d at 310, 313; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 193 F.2d at 327, 328 
 
44 Singh, 939 F.3d at 221-24. 
 
45 Id. at 225-26. 
 
46 Id. at 226. 
 
47 Id. at 226-28. 
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Circuit because the district court did not rule on this issue in its original ruling, so the 
Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court.48 The Third Circuit ruled 
that the summary judgment standard should apply following discovery to clarify the 
arbitration provision and the related incorporated documents.49  
 
IV. Significance  
 The Third Circuit overturning the district court in Singh under section one of the 
FAA is important to the future of arbitration. This decision will likely provide a solid 
precedent for other parties hoping to avoid arbitration. In addition, the Third Circuit may 
have limited the scope of the FAA as the governing document over arbitration 
agreements due to the expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. Finally, the Supreme 
Court may grant certiorari to decide Singh, especially in light of other recently decided 
cases, to address the issue of what classes of workers are exempt from the FAA.  
 First, the issue of transportation workers being able to fight mandatory arbitration 
has been a contentious issue for transportation unions.50 Mandatory arbitration 
agreements are commonplace among independent contractors.51 However, the largest 
truck driver union, the Teamsters, has fought for their unionized drivers to be classified 
as employees, and thus exempted from mandatory arbitration.52 This was the driving 
issue that allowed the Court to decide New Prime.53 New Prime involved a dispute 
between an interstate shipping company and workers who were classified as independent 
contractors, in which the Court ruled that companies could not circumvent federal law by 
classifying employees as independent contractors.54 New Prime marks a shift towards 
further exemptions for those in the transportation industry.55 Singh also follows the ruling 
in New Prime by expanding the coverage of section one of the FAA to independent 
 
48 Id. at 228. 
 
49 Id. at 227-28. 
 
50 Margot Roosevelt, Supreme Court ruling gives truckers a victory and a new weapon in labor war at L.A. 
ports, THELATIMES.COM (Jan. 16, 2019) https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-truckers-supreme-court-
20190116-story.html. 
 
51 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2005) (documenting the rise in popularity of class action waivers 
in contractual arbitration agreements). 
 






55 Shauna Johnson Clark, The “Best of” Litigation Update 2019: An Epic Year For Employment Law: 
2018 in Review, 87 THE ADVOCATE 499, 500 (2019) (discussing the effect that New Prime will have on 
how companies structure their business with independent contractors). 
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contractors.56 This is a trend that more states are following, in which they close loopholes 
in employment law by not allowing companies to classify employees as independent 
contractors to avoid paying benefits that come along with employee status.57 
 Second, there are currently two cases that will be tried in the New Jersey Supreme 
Court involving exemption from FAA due to the residual clause of section one.58 The 
first case involves truck drivers who deliver certain pharmaceuticals who are being forced 
to arbitrate their employment contract.59 The second claim involves a different delivery 
company’s driver who is contesting whether his profession is covered under section one 
of the FAA because he is engaged in interstate commerce.60 It is likely that the decision 
in Singh will give more credence to the plaintiffs’ claims in the aforementioned cases, 
which are attempting to prove they are engaged in interstate commerce.61 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court could use the decision in Singh to justify a more expansive definition of 
interstate commerce, and rule that the two separate plaintiffs are both engaged in 
interstate commerce.  
 Singh is a step towards an expansion of exemptions for the FAA.62 One point 
relied on by Uber was the dicta in Supreme Court case Circuit City v. Adams.63 Uber’s 
argument stated that if Congress wanted to expand the definition of the exemption, 
Congress would enact special legislation in order to accomplish this result.64 The decision 
in Singh does not require Congress to enact new legislation to protect certain classes of 
 
56 Singh, 939 F.3d at 220. 
 
57 V.B. Dubal, Winning The Battle, Losing The War?: Assessing the Impact Of Misclassification Litigation 
on Workers in the Gig Economy, 17 WIS. L. REV. 739 (2017) (discussing “Freelancers Aren’t Free” laws in 
New York that prevents companies from misclassifying workers to avoid employee guarantees such as 
paying minimum wage, overtime, workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, freedom from 
discrimination at work, and the right to collectively bargain). 
 
58 Arafa v. Health Express Corp., A-1862-17T3, 2019 LEXIS 1283 at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 5, 2019); 
Colon v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC, 459 N.J. Super. 349 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 4, 2019). 
 
59 Arafa v. Health Express Corp., A-1862-17T3, 2019 LEXIS 1283 at *1, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 5, 
2019). 
 




62 9 U.S.C. §1 (1925). 
 
63 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2011). 
 
64 Id. at 112 (explaining the circuit split that the Court’s decision would be resolving. Uber used this 
dictum in their argument: “most circuits as having concluded that the residual clause of § 1 only excludes 
"transportation workers, defined, for instance, as those workers 'actually engaged in the movement of goods 
in interstate commerce.’””). 
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employees.65 Instead, the interpretation of which employees are exempt under section one 
is now left to the courts to determine.66 It would not be surprising to see cases decided in 
the future from circuits that have been less friendly to arbitration using section one as 
justification to limit adhesive arbitration agreements.  
 Finally, the Supreme Court has the option of reviewing the decision by the Third 
Circuit. The Supreme Court has shaped the field of arbitration since the introduction of 
the FAA.67 There have never been clearer lines about what areas the FAA preempts and 
what areas are governed by state law.68 Whether workers who transport passengers, the 
issue in Singh, are expempted from the FAA would be well suited for a decision by the 
Supreme Court.69 The Court could either uphold the Third Circuit’s definition and 
explicitly rule that employees that transport passengers are exempt under section one of 
the FAA, or the Court could take a more traditional approach and narrow the exemption 
under section one to only include those individuals who are directly involved in interstate 
commerce.70 While ruling this way may be slightly less consistent with the textual 
reading of the FAA, it would be much more consistent with the liberal federal policy of 
enforcing arbitration agreements.”71 Either way, clarification would be helpful for 
employees and businesses alike. 
 If Uber chooses to appeal, it is possible that the Supreme Court will choose not to 
grant certiorari to Singh. The Supreme Court grants certiorari as a matter of judicial 
discretion, based on a number of factors.72 However, by failing to review Singh, and 
under the new ruling of New Prime, it would be lower courts that are deciding if an 
arbitration agreement is exempt from being enforced under section one.73 States who 
have traditionally viewed as opposing mandatory arbitration may be likely to use this 
new exemption to invalidate arbitration agreements that would otherwise be 
 
65 Singh, 939 F.3d at 223-24 (disagreeing with Uber’s argument and remanding case back to district court 
to continue with proceedings consistent with Third Circuit’s ruling). 
 
66 Singh, 939 F.3d at 221-24, see also New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 538. 
 
67 Craig E. Cataldo, Delegating the Administration of Justice: The Need to Update the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 37 (2019) (explaining the origin of the FAA and the subsequent shaping of the 
FAA by the Supreme Court). 
 
68 See Doctor’s Association, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA preempts state law where applicable). 
 
69 Singh, 939 F.3d at 220. 
 
70 Id. at 226-28. 
 
71 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.  
 
72 SUP. CT. R. 10.  
 
73 New Prime Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 538. 
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enforceable.74 The Supreme Court allowing this result would be atypical, as it is contrary 




 Singh was decided using Third Circuit precedent, but the case may have 
consequences that directly contrast with the Supreme Court’s liberal policy favoring 
arbitration. The Supreme Court has granted immense deference to Congress concerning 
issues of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.76 In doing so, the definition 
of what constitutes interstate commerce now includes almost all commerce.77 Based on 
the holding in Singh, this result could lead to a new wave of challenges to arbitration 
agreements under section one of the FAA.78  
 With the definition of commerce encompassing most industries, the Supreme 
Court has awarded Congress a great deal of oversight in regulating commerce among the 
states.79 At the same time, the Supreme Court has also extended federal preemption in 
arbitration which has led to the FAA is the controlling on almost all arbitration 
agreements.80 Both the expansion of the Commerce Clause and the FAA both come from 
the same basic idea that the federal government has an interest in increasing efficiency in 
both commerce and the adjudicatory process, and cannot have anything hampering the 
growth of these two important fields.81 However, because of the wording in section one 
of the FAA, the exemption of employees who are involved in interstate commerce 
expands as the definition of what is considered related to interstate commerce expands.82 
 
74 McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017) (holding that, as a matter of public policy, 
corporations cannot require consumers to waive right to a public trial). 
 
75 Doctor’s Association, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 
76 See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941), see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (expanding Congress’s power under the 
commerce clause). 
 
77 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress can regulate any activity that has a 
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce). 
 
78 Singh, 939 F.3d at 226-28. 
 
79 Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (ruling that Congress 
has the power to regulate operations in all matters that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).  
 
80 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1, 24, see also Doctor’s Association, Inc., 517 U.S. at 681, 
see also Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1. 
 
81 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1454-55 (1987) 
(Discussing limiting the federal government’s interest under the Commerce Clause to strictly interstate 
transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities closely related to them). 
 
82 9 U.S.C. §1 (1925). 
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The more businesses and related activity is considered interstate commerce, the larger the 
class of employees are that are considered exempt from the FAA under section one.83 If 
the exemption is so large that it covers all classes of workers in transportation, including 
those who are tangentially related to the transport of interstate commerce, the FAA 
effectively becomes less effective in a governing employment contracts.   
 Congress and the courts have a legitimate interest in allowing employees to 
arbitrate their grievances.84 Arbitration is speedier and more efficient, can be less costly, 
and allows greater access for justice to the less wealthy.85 Furthermore, courts would like 
to avoid opportunistic attempts at forum shopping.86 If plaintiff attorneys feel they would 
fare better in court, the attorney can easily claim their client is a worker exempted from 
the FAA under section one. As such, if the exemption under section one is widely 
applied, arbitration agreements are in danger of becoming more of a formality, rather 
than an enforceable agreement.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Singh is a favorable outcome for plaintiffs in the transportation industry that are 
attempting to limit class action lawsuit waivers. Class action waivers have become 
frequent in employment contracts that contain arbitration agreements.87 Since the Court 
has attempted to apply arbitration agreements as they are written and agreed to by parties, 
exemptions and exceptions were generally limited. Singh gives the plaintiffs precedent 
for employees that are directly involved in interstate commerce to avoid mandatory 
arbitration. The Supreme Court would have a good reason to examine a case of this 
nature in greater detail to provide clarification to which class of workers is exempt under 
section one.   
 However, Singh also textually upholds the FAA by correctly determining the class 
of workers that were meant to be exempt from the document.88 Increases in technology 





84 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1  
 
85 Jean Murray, The Difference Between Arbitration and Litigation, THEBALANCESMB.COM (Aug. 13, 
2019) https://www.thebalancesmb.com/arbitration-vs-litigation-what-is-the-difference-398747. 
 
86 Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit 
Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 92 (1998). 
 
87 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2005) (documenting the rise in popularity of class action waivers 
in contractual arbitration agreements). 
 
88 9 U.S.C. §1 (1925). 
 
89 Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://www.bts.gov/browse-
statistical-products-and-data/transportation-economic-trends/tet-2017-chapter-4 (last visited Jan. 6, 2019). 
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economy is one of the largest in the country. According to the Department of 
Transportation, over 13,000,000 workers are employed in the transportation and 
warehouse sector.90 Such a large class of workers being exempt from the FAA is counter 
to the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide a uniform standard for all parties during 
arbitration disputes. This case is perhaps an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 











90 Id.  
